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One of the more recurrent debates among Basque historians 
has to do with the very object of their primary concern. Since a 
Basque political body, real or imagined, has never existed before 
the end of the nineteenth century -and formally not until 1936-
an «essentialist» question has permanently been hanging around 
the mind of any Basque historian: she might be writing the histo-
ry of an non-existent subject. On the other hand, the heaviness 
of the «national dispute» between Basque and Spanish identities 
in the Spanish Basque territories has deeply determined the mean-
ing of such a cardinal question. Denying the «other's» historicity 
is a very well known weapon in the hands of any nationalist dis-
course and, conversely, claiming to have a millenary past behind 
one's shoulders, or being the bearer of a single people's history, is 
a must for any «national» history. Consequently, for those who 
consider the Spanish one as the true national identity and the 
Basque one just a secondary «decoration», the history of the 
Basque Country simply does not exist or it refers to the last six 
decades. On the other hand, for those Basques who deem the 
Spanish an imposed identity, Basque history is a sacred territory, 
the last refuge for the true identity. 
Although apparently uncontaminated by politics, Basque aca-
demic historiography gently reproduces discourses based on na-
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tionalist assumptions. Almost every single author on Basque his-
tory seems to feel the obligation of starting with some kind of 
declaration of national identity containing an explanation of why 
she refers as Basque to the three provinces that formed the Au-
tonomous Community of the Basque Country, or to these provinc-
es plus Navarre, or even to the whole Basque-speaking territories 
on both sides of the Pyrenees. Opting for one of the several names 
available for the «Basque thing» as a subject matter -Euskadi, 
Pais Vasco, Provincias Vascas, Vasconia, Euskal Herria- usually 
brings about also a political classification. Even if not deliberately 
and expressly claimed by the author, it would be easy for any 
Basque scholar to identify the ideology of her colleague just check-
ing how she names the Basque subject. 
This is just a shallow symptom of a deeper condition of Basque 
historiography which, in my opinion, is still today debating with 
Sabino Arana. It was the forefather of the Basque nationalist 
movement who first declared divided the historical experiences of 
the Basques and the Spaniards. As Javier Corcuera demonstrated 
in his penetrating analysis of the origins of Basque nationalism, 
Sabino Arana was no more than a product of his time: as many 
of his contemporaries he was a racist obsessed with the identifica-
tion of a single Basque type among the complicated map of races 
resulting from the chauvinist fever that affected European intel-
lectuality by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries1• Even if his knowledge of Basque history was 
rather a poor one, he did not hesitate in choosing history as the 
main source of Basque national idiosyncrasy. In Bizcaya par su 
Independencia (1892), a very poorly reasoned brochure about Bis-
cayan history, he successfully introduced a new conception of the 
Basque past as an unfinished dispute against Spain for national 
sovereignty. Two years later Arana decided that the very turning 
point of modem Basque history was not to be fixed in 1876 -when 
the Spanish parliament abolished the Basque Fueros2- but in 
I Javier Corcuera, La patria de l.os vascos, Madrid, Taurus, 2000 pp. 209 ff and 359 ff. 
2 I will use here the word «Fueros» or «Fuero» -and the adjective «foral»- in 
Spanish. It could be translated into English as «special statute», although it also 
means the juridical and political culture associated to it. Note that the word was 
not only used in modern Spain to make reference to the Basque provincial statutes, 
but also to municipal privileges (as in Fuero de Burgos), the privileges of any kind 
of corporation (Fuero eclesiastico), or even the special legislation for Native Amer-
icans (fueros de los indios). 
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1839. Although in 1839 the Spanish Cortes passed a law confirm-
ing and not abolishing the Fueros of the Basque Provinces, for «el 
Maestro» that was the annus horribilis for Basque independence3 . 
The only reason why Arana abhorred the law confirming the 
Basque foral system in 1839 was its capacity to integrate Basque 
constitutional peculiarities inside the Spanish constitutional mon-
archy. In other words, Arana, a confessed antiliberal, wanted to 
avoid the evil of constitutional modernity in the only pure Catho-
lic redoubt remaining after the collapse of the ancient Spanish 
Catholic monarchy, namely Euzkadi4• What is important to us is 
that in doing so Arana stressed the historical rupture between the 
Basque and the Spanish. No more integration or sharing of com-
mon projects: conquest and redemption were the new key concepts 
provided by Arana for the interpretation of Basque history. As a 
consequence, the history of the nineteenth century could only be 
an account of a conflicting relationship between the Spanish con-
stitution and Basque Fueros in which the second had been finally 
superseded by the first. From an Aranist point of view, the only 
possible end of history could be the recovery of the Fueros reinter-
preted as the independence of the «euskos». 
With a few exceptions the Aranist conception of modern Bas-
que history has certainly proved to be successful. Most of the 
Basque scholars unquestionably accept an account of the history 
of the nineteenth century in which the contradiction and confron-
tation between Basque Fueros and the Spanish constitution is tak-
en for granted. They would also assert that those Basque Fueros 
had been previously under attack, at least from the beginning of 
the eighteenth century onwards. According to this «official» ver-
sion of the Basque modem history the clash between Spain and 
the Basque Country is a continuum for the last two centuries 
3 The two articles of this law read: «Articulo 1: Se confirman los Fueros de las 
Provincias Vascongadas y Navarra, sin perjuicio de la unidad constitucional de la 
Monarquia. 
Articulo 2. El Gobiemo, tan pronto como la oportunidad lo permita y oyendo 
antes a las Provincias Vascongadas y Navarra, propondra a las Cortes la modifi-
caci6n indispensable que en los mencionados Fueros reclame el interes de las mis-
mas, conciliado con el general de la naci6n y de la constituci6n de la monarquia 
resolviendo entre tanto provisionalmente y en la forma y sentido expresado las dudas 
y dificultades que puedan ofrecerse dando cuenta de ello a las Cortes.» 
4 Euzkadi was the name that Sabino Arana invented to refer to the set of Basque 
provinces as a country. Literally it means the place populated by euzkos (another 
invention of Sabino Arana), that is, the people who speak Basque. 
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which, consequently, could only eventually be solved through the 
implementation of two different nation-States. 
In this paper I would like to challenge these assumptions about 
the modem history of the Basque Country. In other words, I pro-
pose saying «agur» (farewell) to Sabino Arana and revisit the use-
fulness of a modem history of the Basque Country from a point 
of view that avoids the ideas of conquest -military or constitu-
tional- and the set of related concepts that usually conform the 
Basque historiographical discourse -confrontation, contradiction, 
Fueros vs. Constitution, Basque vs. Spanish, etc. In doing so I am 
not claiming for any kind of «vindication» of Spain or the Span-
ishness of the Basques. Even if the latter could be easily demon-
strated by just taking a look at the Basque history prior to the 
twentieth century, it would be no more than a revival of a nation-
alist perspective. What I am suggesting is that the best -and in 
my opinion practically the only- way to continue writing about 
Spanish or Basque history is just giving up writing on Basque or 
Spanish history. What follows is an explanation of this paradox. 
BACK TO THE BEGINNING: AMERICA 
It could be said that mine is partially an orteguiana interpreta-
tion, since Jose Ortega y Gasset used a similar approach to explain 
the «modernity» of Basque and Catalan nationalism versus the 
«obsoleteness» of the idea of Spanish nation. Ortega y Gasset ar-
gued that Spain as a national project powered by Castille brought 
the arid and steppe kingdom to a leading position in the world. 
Ortega's historical recreation of Spain as a national project was 
strictly linked to the idea of a conquering monarchy and, conse-
quently, he envisaged the decline and fall of the Spanish nation 
in the process of consolidation and stabilization of the «Hispanic» 
monarchy. Since from the end of the sixteenth century onwards 
there were no more great conquests, no more remarkable military 
projects, he concluded that it should also be the starting point of 
Spanish decadence. 
Ortega's historiographical pessimism was wrapped in the lan-
guage of realism: «El proceso incorporativo va en crecimiento 
hasta Felipe II. El a:fio vigesimo de su reinado puede considerarse 
como la divisoria de los destinos peninsulares. Hasta su cima, la 
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historia de Espana es ascendente y acumulativa; desde ella hacia 
nosotros, la historia de Espana es decadente y dispersiva.» 5 For 
Ortega, the place of Basque and Catalan nationalism is right here, 
in the decadence and collapse of the Spanish-Castilian nation. 
Following an influential interpretation fueled in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century by Antonio Ca.novas del Castillo -who 
was several times prime minister and the alma mater of the abo-
lition of Basque Fueros in 1876- one of Ortega's obsessions was 
the interpretation of the Spanish nation in a context of decaden-
ce6. Though used as a contrast to show Spanish national deca-
dence, Ortega placed Basque and Catalan vigorous nationalism in 
a long-duree process lasting from the end of the sixteenth century. 
Notwithstanding the explicit nationalist perspective adopted in 
his political writings, the usefulness of Ortega's interpretation of 
separatism in modern Spain rests on the global reading of inter-
related facts that he proposes. Like Ortega, I believe that a double 
process of expansion and contraction labels the history of mod-
em Spain, and that eventually its history could have been a jour-
ney from Castille to Castille. The conqueror monarchy originated 
around the kingdom of Castille, whose expansion, begun against 
the Arab kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula and followed against 
the American peoples from 1492 until the end of the eighteenth 
century, was reduced again to its peninsular size -plus the Ca-
nary and Balearic islands- in a process of contraction from 1811 
to 1898. By no means 1898 put an end to this trend of contrac-
tion. On the contrary, the simultaneous emergence of the power-
ful Basque and Catalan nationalism, later the Galician too, kept 
the process alive and the menace of new territorial reductions 
permanently hanging over the head of the Spanish nation. The 
proclamation of the Catalan Republic from the balcony of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya in Barcelona in 1931, was a symptom 
that in the troublesome first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury the historical circle could have been closed contracting Spain 
again to Castille. 
Where my hypothesis differs from an orteguiana interpretation 
5 Jose Ortega y Gasset, Espana invertebrada. Bosquejo de algunos pensamientos 
hist6ricos (1921), in Obras completas, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1950 vol. III, 
p. 67. 
6 Inman Fox, La invenci6n de Espana. Nacionalismo liberal e identidad nacional, 
Madrid, Catedra, 1997 cap. III. 
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is in the fact that I do not care about a fatal fate of the «Spanish 
nation». I am not interested in explaining the «decadence» of 
«Spain», but the overlapping of the concepts of autonomy and 
independence in an Atlantic crisis of the Spanish monarchy. Con-
sequently, my research assumes that the contraction has to be 
interpreted as a transition from a Hispanic monarchy to a Span-
ish nation. From my own point of view, the contraction is not re-
lated to «decadence», beginning by the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, but to the birth of modem constitutionalism at the beginning · 
of the nineteenth century. To be more precise, I think that it was 
just a single sentence that ignited the big-bang of the dissolution 
of the Hispanic monarchy contained in the first article of the first 
Spanish constitution (1812) which reads: «La Nacion espafiola es 
la reunion de todos los espafioles de ambos hemisferios. » 
Seen in the context of the Atlantic revolutions and modern 
constitutionalism, the constitutional experiment performed in 
Cadiz between 1810 and 1812 by an uncertain number of depu-
ties who pretended to represent the whole monarchy from Barce-
lona to Manila was absolutely unique. Never before and never 
again was a constitution intended to transform a whole ancient 
empire into a new single nation. Stating that the «Spanish Na-
tion» was a reunion of Spaniards spread over three different con-
tinents was undoubtedly more a political dream than a practical 
definition, as Jeremy Bentham pointed out in 18207• However, this 
wishful thinking demonstrated to be a powerful engine for the 
making of republics, nations, and states: in less than fifteen years 
more than ten different and separated political entities had been 
created out of the «Spanish nation» defined in Cadiz in 1812. 
Spain itself was no more than one of these «new republics» com-
ing out of the collapse of the Hispanic monarchy. 
Thus, the birth of constitutionalism in the Hispanic Atlantic, 
and not a cultural or «spiritual» decadence of the Spanish nation, 
paralleled the contraction of the Hispanic monarchy. In other 
words, my interpretation ceases to be orteguiana since I do not 
7 Jeremy Bentham, Colonies, commerce, and constitutional law: Rid yourselves of 
Ultramaria and other writings on Spain and Spanish America, ed. Philip Schofield, 
Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. An analysis of Bentham's 
advice to the Spanish liberals in Bartolome Clavero, «jLibraos de Ultramaria!» El 
fruto podrido de Cadiz», in Jose M. lfturritegui and Jose M. Portillo (eds.), Consti-
tuci6n en Espana. Origenes y destinos, Madrid, CECP, 1999. 
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believe that it was the decadence of the Spanish nation but its very 
political emergence that ignited the contraction of the Hispanic 
world. From the reading of the discourses exhibited by the Ameri-
can Creole leaders it was also clear that in this process of contrac-
tion separatism the creation of new differentiated political bodies 
was only a possibility among many others. Practically all of the 
institutions created by American urban elites were initially more 
interested in setting up a new Hispanic political agreement than 
in creating separated republics. A federal monarchy led by a Span-
ish emperor and composed by several American monarchies, or a 
series of autonomous parliaments and governments united in some 
kind of «Hispanic Senate», or simply a consistent development of 
the «diputaci6n provincial» as defined in the Spanish constitution 
of 1812 were among the possibilities pointed out by American lead-
ers in order to keep the new Spanish nation united. 
Accustomed as we are to consider the nation-State as an un-
questionable fact, it is difficult for us to imagine how unexpected 
it was at the beginning of the constitutional era. More clearly than 
in other spaces, in the Hispanic world the «state» or the «nation» 
are literally latecomers. The concept of nation as a political com-
pact embracing an extended area institutionalized as a state, far 
from being easily granted and accepted had to deal and negotiate 
with other more powerful categories, namely with the concept of 
«Pueblo». Coming from the old Iberian tradition of local political 
bodies and governments, the pueblo, and not the nation or the 
state as a unified political space was supposed to be the true and 
original recipient of sovereignty. Hence, in the context of a gener-
al crisis of the monarchy originated by the invasion of the Penin-
sula by Napoleon's army in 1808, sovereignty was mainly placed 
in the pueblos and not in the nation or the state -actually the 
Spanish state almost ceased to exist due to the institutional col-
lapse that followed the invasion. 
Resulting from such a scenario composed by a universe of pue-
blos barely kept united after Ferdinand VII irresponsibly ceded the 
crown to Napoleon, the Hispanic nations had to deal and negoti-
ate its own existence with different pueblos. In fact, the Hispanic 
nations have been negotiating until the present time, both in 
Spain and in Spanish America, with the heirs of the pueblos (ter-
ritories, provinces, cities, pueblos de indios, states, or now auton-
omous communities in Spain). It was in the process of negotiat-
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ing nationality that the Spanish nation lost the majority of its 
territory as defined in 1812. The metropolitan governments, both 
liberal and absolutist, never accepted the political consequences of 
defining all the Spaniards from both hemispheres as the «Span-
ish nation». As their northern neighbors knew very well, being 
part of the nation implied autonomy and equal political represen-
tation in the imperial-national parliament. What the American 
colonists had unsuccessfully claimed from England before becom-
ing independent seemed to be promised by the Spanish Cortes in 
1812 to the Creole elites. 
Despite the promising statements that could be read by the 
Spanish Americans on the constitution, the Hispanic laboratory 
was in fact about to reveal the limits of liberalism. The idea of 
local and territorial autonomy through the implementation of 
«ayuntamientos» and «diputaciones provinciales» was introduced 
in the Spanish constitution of 1812 following the suggestions of 
a Mexican deputy (Miguel Ramos Arizpe) probably inspired by the 
Basque foral institutions -Juntas generales and diputaciones. 
When it came to practice, though, autonomy was denied to Amer-
ican territories while it was granted to Basque Provinces or other 
peninsular territories. For the European part of the monarchy the 
liberal constitution of 1812 even meant a revival of territorial 
autonomy, as testefied by the cases of Catalonia and Asturias wit-
nessed. For the American rim of the «Spanish nation», however, 
it was an experience of inequality and of negation of autonomy. 
To put it briefly: the Peninsulars were admitted to the Spanish na-
tion while the Americans were literally expelled from it. As the ex-
clusion of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines from the consti-
tution since 183 7 will demonstrate, Spanish liberalism -like 
European liberalism in general- never accepted that liberal prin-
ciples could be liberally implemented also in their non-European 
dominions. 
The case of the first Spanish liberalism, however, presents a 
more complicated itinerary than the French constitution of 1791 
declaring the colonies non-constitutional territories, or than the 
British government not accepting American representatives in the 
European parliamentary institutions. On the contrary, the Span-
ish constitution of 1812, as recalled before, declared the whole 
monarchy to be a single «Nacion espafiola» and, consequently, 
accepted that America (and the Philippines) sent their representa-
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tives to the Cortes (parliament) as the European provinces did. 
What the Spanish (European) liberals could hardly accept were 
the political implications of such a declaration. They never recog-
nized in their American fellows (the Creole elite) the same right 
to create autonomous governments (Juntas) they had implement-
ed in Spain, and, when it came to representation, they literally cut 
off several millions of people from the electoral rolls (basically 
people from African ancestry and «non-civilized Indians») decreas-
ing the American elite's political relevance. In doing so Peninsular 
liberalism proved to be absolutely unable to share the nation with 
any other non-European territories. From now onwards, the re-
maining American and Asian Spanish dependencies were official-
ly considered «dominions» and treated as colonies8• 
Between 1811 and 1826 a series of republics emerged from the 
«Spanish nation» defined in the Cadiz constitution in 1812. De-
liberately and expressly all of them declared themselves to be free 
and independent from any other power and namely from Spain. 
As masterfully analyzed by Jaime E. Rodriguez the political dis-
courses of the urban Creole elites that promoted the declarations 
of independence were originally closer to autonomy and Home 
Rule than to independence. The ethnic and social complexity of 
Spanish American societies, the commercial interest in being part 
of a world-system connecting the Mediterranean with the Pacific 
through the Atlantic, and a sincere feeling of attachment to the 
Spanish monarchy were among the reasons that fueled the search 
for autonomy instead of independence9 • Juan German Roscio, a 
salient ideologue of the Venezuelan revolution, declared that be-
coming independent was a very serious and transcendent step 
that Americans were forced to take. In an intense and introspec-
tive analysis of his own transition from a loyal subject of the 
Spanish crown to a revolutionary supporter of independence for 
Venezuela, he insisted on the constitutional segregation of the 
Americans 1°. 
8 See Josep Marfa Fradera, Gobernar colonias, Barcelona, Peninsula, 1999. 
9 Jaime E. Rodriguez 0., The Independence of Spanish America, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998. 
10 «Yo vi desplomarse en Espana el edificio de su nueva Constituci6n. Liberal, 
sin duda, con el territorio de la Peninsula, con las islas Baleares y Canarias, era 
muy mezquina con los paises de ultramar en cuanto al derecho de representaci6n. 
Por mas que desde los primeros pasos de la revoluci6n se habfa proclamado igual-
dad omnimoda de derechos, claudicaban las proclamas en la practica, y fueron 
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Roscio and other «espafioles americanos» -as they called 
themselves while demanding autonomy and Home Rule- were 
perfectly aware that their claims of self-government were by no 
means contradictory with the constitutional basis of the Spanish 
monarchy. Not only a number of autonomous governments had 
been set up during the crisis of 1808, but also the Basque Prov-
inces offered a neat paradigm of self-government. The preliminary 
discourse to the constitutional project submitted to the Spanish 
Cortes in 1810, later approved as the first Spanish constitution in 
1812, expressly referred to the Basque Provinces as the last redoubt 
of freedom and self-government before ministerial despotism. This 
discourse -written by Agustin Arguelles, a conspicuous leader of 
the liberal faction in the Cortes- also recognized that the system 
of provincial autonomy contained in the constitution had been 
inspired by the foral Basque system. 
It can be said that what the «espafioles americanos» demanded 
in order to re-edit a political contract with Spain after the crisis of 
the monarchy was just to be considered as Basques. It is not by 
chance that ninety years later, in 1898, the Filipino leader Jose Rizal 
in front of the execution squad in fulfillment of the death penalty 
imposed by the Spanish authorities, declared: «I just wanted for the 
Philippines a foral system like the one enjoyed by the Province of 
Alava». The Basque system of autonomy and self-administration 
seems to have played a major role as a paradigm and as a desired 
object for other peoples and territories in the Hispanic world. Maybe 
Basque modem history provided more useful constitutional informa-
tion for the contemporaries of that huge Hispanic crisis than what 
present-day historiography usually recognizes. It might be that mod-
em Basque history makes more sense in the context of an Atlantic 
crisis than under the aranista command of reproducing a permanent 
conflict with Spain. 
luego desmentidas en el nuevo c6digo constitucional. Llore sin embargo su ruina, y 
suspiraba por su restablecimiento y mejora.» Juan German Roscio, El triunfo de la 
libertad sabre el despotismo. En la confesi6n de un pecador arrepentido de sus errores 
poUticos, y dedicado a desagraviar en esta parte a la religion ofendida con el sistema de 
la tirania (1817), Caracas, Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1996 p. 3. 
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IN SEARCH OF AUTONOMY: A BASQUE PHASE IN THE ATLANTIC CRISIS 
The first phase in the transition from the Hispanic monarchy 
to the Spanish nation was closed by 1825 with the completion of 
the independence of the whole continental Spanish America. The 
most common term used to define what had happened, though, 
was not «independence» but «emancipation». The most usual im-
age of the former metropolis, Spain, was no longer the «mother 
country» but a malicious step-mother was always disposed to sac-
rifice her daughters' happiness. The «emancipation» meant a to-
tal breaking-off between Spain and the new Spanish American re-
publics never substituted by any kind of Spanish Commonwealth. 
When the constitutional revolution revived in Spain in 1836, the 
«nation» had been drastically reduced to the peninsular territories 
and the Canary and Balearic Islands. Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Phil-
ippines and other minor islands in the Pacific still remained un-
der Spanish control not as parts of the «Spanish nation», but 
merely as «extra-constitutional» colonies. 
That contraction from the Hispanic monarchy to Spain as we 
know it today by no means put an end to the essential political 
question opened in 1812 about the relationship between the na-
tion and the territories. A decade after the battle of Ayacucho 
(1824) -that brought about the end of Spanish domination in 
continental America- Spain was facing again the same constitu-
tional question. Now the challenge came from the Basque Prov-
inces and Navarre where the so called «Cuesti6n de Fueros» over-
lapped with the civil war between liberals and absolutists. The 
Carlist war (1833-1839) confronted supporters of the pretender 
Carlos Maria Isidro de Borbon (Carlos V), who incarnated tradi-
tionalism and absolute monarchy, and the supporters of his niece 
Isabel II, a three years old girl tutored by her mother Maria Cris-
tina, who was identified with liberalism and constitutional mon-
archy. 
The majority of the eyewitnesses and contemporary political 
commentators and analysts -Spanish or foreigners- pointed out 
that the Fueros or Basque peculiar statutory system had nothing 
to do with the origin of the war. Actually when it begun, in 1833, 
the Basque and Navarrese foral systems were perfectly intact not 
being questioned until 1837. However, by 1839 it was also clear 
for almost every single politician in Madrid that putting an end 
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to the war in the north would imply the recognition of some form 
of foral self-government for the Basque Provinces and Navarre. A 
couple of embraces rubricated the end of the war in the Basque 
area. The first took place in Vergara, Guipuzcoa, where the gen-
eral commanders of both armies signed an agreement, known as 
«abrazo de Vergara», according to which the carlist army had to 
be demobilized while the chief commander of the queen's army 
-Baldomero Espartero, by far the most influential military at that 
time- promised to suggest that the government promote a legis-
lation recognizing the Fueros. 
Thus, the Ley de Fueros approved in October 1839 had its true 
origin in a military agreement rubricated by a public hug before 
the troops of both generals, which -like shaking hands- had a 
very concrete meaning in a culture of honor. «El honor de un 
general espafiol esta comprometido», was a sentence repeated 
once and again in the Congress when debating the bill presented 
by the government in fulfillment of the military agreement of 
Vergara. The first parliamentary recognition of the Basque Fuer-
os is, consequently, understandable only if seen as the result of a 
romantic conception of honor. As a matter of fact, the Spanish 
Cortes reproduced during the debate of this law a romantic sce-
nario where truly passionate characters played a political drama. 
After toughly arguing for a month the progressive and the 
conservative branches of the Congress arrived to an impasse that, 
apparently, could only be solved by fighting a duel. However the 
romantic rules of honor foresaw a different, less violent, way of 
dealing with such a situation. Invoking the superior value of the 
Spanish nation, the leader of the progressive faction -Salustiano 
016zaga- and the minister of Defense -the conservative Isidro 
Alaix- run to the middle of the floor of Parliament and hugged 
one another, while the minister of Justice -Lorenzo Arrazola-
wrote down the text that would be immediately approved as the 
«Ley Confirmatoria de los de Fueros de las Provincias Vasconga-
das y de Navarra». Two months after the original embrace in Ver-
gara, on October 25, 1839 the Spanish senate finally approved a 
piece of legislation in which the Spanish Cortes confirmed the 
Fueros of Alava, Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Navarre. Moreover, the 
Spanish parliament declared that the Basque and Navarrese foral 
systems were perfectly compatible with the constitutional unity of 
the monarchy. 
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Unnecessary to say that the Juntas or provincial assemblies of 
the three Basque provinces and the diputaci6n of Navarre were 
full of praise for the Spanish government and for the Cortes. They 
immediately interpreted that simple law -it had just a couple of 
articles- as an additional act to the Spanish constitution. Not-
withstanding the fact that Sabino Arana declared this piece of 
legislation taboo -indelibly marking its interpretation- for Bas-
que provincial elites there was no doubt that the Spanish Cortes 
had sanctioned a cohabitation of the Basque provincial constitu-
tional peculiarities and the Spanish constitutional monarchy. 
Interpreted in the context of the transition from the Hispanic 
monarchy to the Spanish nation, i.e. in the Atlantic scenario, the 
«Basque phase» informs about the possibilities of autonomy in 
modern constitutionalism. In sharp contrast with what had recent-
ly happened in Spanish America, the recognition of the Basque 
provincial self-government and its reinforcement during the fol-
lowing decades until 1876 revealed that centralism was not nec-
essarily a must in the process of Spanish modern state formation, 
as often both, liberal and nationalist historians have taken for 
granted. The most salient theoretician of European liberalism in 
the central decades of nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, 
took note of the law confirming the Fueros in 1839 as the basis 
for some kind of confederal relationship between the Basque Prov-
inces and the Spanish monarchy. 
It is true that the inclusive recognition of a particular Basque 
provincial nationality and, consequently, the capacity for self-gov-
ernment was by no means surprising for the contemporaries. 
European political and constitutional thought traditionally envis-
aged the «Biscayan constitution» as a model of a republican and 
libertarian system of government. Although earlier examples could 
be added, let me just briefly refer to the case of John Geddes, a 
Scottish liberal catholic who went to Spain to support the substi-
tution of the Jesuits in educational institutions promoted by the 
enlightened faction that was in power in the 1770s. A friend of 
the president of the Council of Castille -the top governmental 
and judicial institution of the monarchy- Pedro Rodriguez Cam-
pomanes, and surely advised by him, John Geddes went through 
the reading of what seemed to him a very rare book entitled 
«Fueros, Privilegios, Franquezas y Libertades del Muy Noble y Muy 
Leal Sefiorio de Vizcaya». Even if dated in 1527 and printed for 
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the first time in Burgos in 1528, it was not at all an antiquity but 
a code of laws that was well known and used daily in Valladolid 
-in the Sala del Juez Mayor de Vizcaya of the Chancilleria or judi-
cial courts-, the city where John Geddes was directing the Cole-
gio de Escoceses 11 • 
Geddes did not hesitate to send a copy of the Fueros de Viz-
caya to the Archaeological Society of Scotland preceded by a com-
mentary in which he identified the Fueros as a sample of an an-
cient Celtic constitution. Reading on the first title of the Fueros 
about the liberties of the Biscayans, the limits of their Lord's au-
thority, and the judicial guarantees Geddes concluded that the 
Fueros could be accurately located in the same constitutional at-
mosphere as the ancient Celtic liberties sung in the Ossian/ 
McPherson poems -not by chance translated into Spanish by that 
time in Valladolid. Probably Geddes had been delighted by the sto-
ry -reproduced in his report- of the Scottish prince Jaun Zuria, 
the White Lord who, according to a tradition invented by Lope 
Garcia de Salazar by the end of the fifteenth century, supposedly 
led the Biscayans to victory against the army of the king of Leon 
Ordofio III in the ninth century. Even if the story unmistakably 
smelled of invention, here Geddes had the link he needed to dem-
onstrate the Celticness of the Biscayan Fueros. 
About a decade later, the future second president of the Unit-
ed States of America, John Adams, wrote extensively on compara-
tive constitutionalism in a book intended to promote some reforms 
in the republican government of his country. Commissioned as the 
representative of the government of the US before the British king, 
Adams became an expert in European constitutionalism. As expect-
ed from someone with a solid background in the English juridical 
principles, Adams' constitutional tourism was not limited to «mod-
em» or «revolutionary» constitutionalism -which would have got 
him to a dessert in Europe by that time, 1785-1787. He was par-
ticularly interested in those constitutions with any useful infor-
mation from a republican point of view. Thus, he studied both 
ancient and modern democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical re-
publics. Adams included the «Biscayan republic» in the first set of 
11 I analyzed and translated into Spanish this text in «Locura cantabrica o la 
republica en la monarqufa. Percepci6n ilustrada de la constituci6n vizcaina», Anua-
rio de Historia del Derecho Espanol, LXVII (vol. I), 1988. 
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democratic republics along with St. Marino, Holland, and some of 
the Swiss cantons. 
Notwithstanding the notable mistakes made by Adams in his 
account on Biscayan government and geography, the future pres-
ident perfectly understood the republican nature of the foral con-
stitution. First, he pointed out the relevance of local powers that 
actually constituted a confederation of local republics. On the oth-
er hand, he also envisaged the aristocratic touch added by the 
hidalguia -lower nobility- required for political participation, 
which he interpreted as a lesson to be taken into account by 
Americans in order to avoid the perversion of democracy12 • As 
Geddes did, Adams thought he was before a Celtic constitutional 
tradition and, as for the case of the Grisons and other Swiss peo-
ples, he stated that only in a mountainous country could such 
constitution remain alive. 
An extraordinary essay recently published by Jorge Cafiizares-
Esguerra about the relationship between historiography, enlight-
enment, and Spanish/Creole identity in Spanish America by the 
end of the eighteenth century allows us to better understand the 
position acquired by the Basque provincial constitutions right be-
fore the Atlantic crisis of the Hispanic monarchy13 • Following some 
suggestions made by David A. Brading in his masterful essay on 
the origins and development of Spanish American Creole patriot-
ism, Canizares-Esguerra analyzes the debate on the nature of 
American history and culture in the late eighteenth century14 • 
Unlike in the case of Biscay, European enlightenment never re-
cognized in the Amerindian tradition anything comparable to a 
particular constitution. Cornelius de Pauw, Guillaume-Thomas 
Raynal, or William Robertson -just to mention the three most 
influential authors- were interested in a critique of the Spanish 
colonization of America that by no means was an apology of the 
Amerindian peoples and their culture. All of them -as generally 
the European enlightenment did- took for granted that America 
12 «Thus we see the people themselves have established by law a contracted 
aristocracy, under the appearance of a liberal democracy. Americans, beware!» 
13 Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World. Histo-
ries, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2001. 
14 David A. Branding, The First America. The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, 
and the Liberal State, /492-1867, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
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was destined for European colonialism. Actually their critique was 
addressed to the lack of true commercial colonialism in the case 
of the Spanish American dominions. From this point of view none 
of them were really interested in knowing about Amerindian peo-
ples and their traditions. In fact, the European enlightenment's 
books on America were written by authors that never stepped foot 
in America. 
Francisco Javier Clavijero (1731-1787) wrote the most power-
ful answer to all these European books on America. A Jesuit, Cla-
vijero was expelled from the Spanish monarchy in 1767 and went 
to Italy, where he first published his Storia Antica del Messico 
(1780-1781) later translated into Spanish and other European lan-
guages. As Juan Jose de Eguiara y Eguren did first, Clavijero no-
ticed in the introduction to his voluminous treaty that the Euro-
pean historical essays on the Amerindian peoples and cultures had 
been written by authors who had never been to America and that 
did not know a word of American languages. They did not ever 
know the correct spelling of American names. 
Clavijero's book is a vindication of Creole identity and, simul-
taneously, a vindication of the Spanish monarchy as a global sys-
tem. Though introducing himself as an author who could offer a 
more accurate approach to Amerindian past just because of his 
knowledge of the country and its languages, Clavijero was not 
exactly interested in explaining the pre-Hispanic civil history of the 
American peoples. He deliberately reconstructed an ideal Mexican 
Mediterranean where an Aztec classicism could be recognized by 
European eyes. To some extent -the comparison is totally mine 
since he never referred to the case of Biscay- Clavijero wanted 
ancient Mexico to have a republican historical background com-
parable to the Celtic-Basque tradition of the Sefiorio de Vizcaya, 
or Provincias of Alava and Guipuzcoa. As his co-religious Juan de 
Velasco (1727-1791) did for the case of the Kingdom of Quito, the 
Creole point of view of Clavijero implied a recognition of the 
moral superiority of the Spanish conquest over the precedent 
Amerindian cultures. 
The cancellation of the true Amerindian past was not intend-
ed, from a Creole point of view, to bring about also an invalida-
tion of the Creole patriotic identity. On the contrary, during the 
following decades the development of the Creole political discours-
es will show that renouncing an Amerindian past was a necessary 
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step towards the vindication of a constitutional place in the Span-
ish monarchy as «espaiioles americanos». The writings of Servan-
do Teresa de Mier -weird as they are- are not only the product 
of a lunatic mind that dreamed about the existence of Atlantis just 
to make it possible for St. Thomas (Quetzalcoatl) to preach in 
America before the arrival of the Spaniards. He also wrote on the 
idea of an American «ancient constitution» made out of the agree-
ments between the Spanish monarchy and the conquistadors, the 
forefathers of the Creole elite. Such an American constitution was 
just a transmutation of the Aragonese, Navarrese, or Biscayan 
constitutions: a series of fundamental laws limiting the power of 
the king and granting liberties to the subjects. 
As the Atlantic crisis of the monarchy approached, many oth-
er authors tried to make the principles of Creole patriotism accept-
able to the metropolitan authorities. They never succeeded. Even 
the most liberal of the Spanish institutions of this period, the 
Cortes of Cadiz, literally ignored the Creole demands of recogni-
tion of their kingdoms and provinces as political bodies. In 1813, 
after the liberation of the Basque provinces from French domina-
tion, the Cortes sent a copy of the Constitution to the Juntas 
Generales, the provincial parliaments, to be sworn as the funda-
mental law of the monarchy. In sending the text to the provincial 
assemblies, the Cortes acknowledged the political entity of the 
«ancient» Basque representative institutions. The American Juntas, 
created in the name of Ferdinand VII as their counterparts in the 
Spanish peninsula, never received from the Cortes or the govern-
ments of Ferdinand VII anything other than the army to get them 
dissolved. 
Seen from an Atlantic perspective the period opened by the law 
confirming the Basque Fueros in 1839 meant the realization of 
the autonomy that was impossible for the Spanish Americans to 
enjoy in the Spanish monarchy. European enlightened thought 
had previously admitted the idiosyncratic character of those Eu-
ropean constitutions of territories -like the Swiss cantons or Bis-
cay- that belonged to other major political structures. According 
to the descriptions offered by European thinkers that got interest-
ed in them, up to a point and even if under a monarchy or a larg-
er confederation, any of the European territories endowed with a 
peculiar constitution could be said to be independent. 
As stated in the «Bible» of the European international public 
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law, the Droit des Gens of Emmerich de Vattel, only those «peo-
ples» joined together for the defense of their liberty and independ-
ence, were to be properly considered «nations». Having a proper 
constitution was, consequently a must to be taken into account 
in the universe of nations. Otherwise, a reunion of human beings 
could be a village, city, town, congregation, colony, factory, or 
dependency but not a «nation» 15 • After the war of Succession 
( 1700-1713) and the abolition of the constitutions of the territo-
ries of the Aragonese crown (Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and 
Mallorca) with the Decretos de Nueva Planta ( 1 707-1716) the only 
remaining territories with a peculiar constitutional identity in the 
Spanish monarchy were the provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa, the 
Sefiorio de Vizcaya, and the Reino de Navarra -that decidedly 
supported the Bourbon cause. 
The expression with which unofficially these territories were 
labeled, provincias exentas -often used in administrative docu-
ments to refer to the whole Basque and Navarrese area- denotes 
their constitutional singularity. The political literature used other 
more colorful terms like «Provincias Unidas del Norte de Espana», 
or «republicas provinciales». The idea -shared by a number of 
foreign travelers- that the Basque and Navarrese area constitut-
ed some kind of asylum for freedom and liberty in the context of 
a despotic ministerialism, was common place by the end of the 
eighteenth century. The first steps taken by modem Spanish con-
stitutionalism far from breaking up with this tradition, deliberate-
ly integrated the Basque constitutional tradition into the new 
Spanish fundamental laws. It is not that the first Spanish consti-
tution specifically mentioned the Basque and Navarrese peculiar-
ities (no Spanish constitution has mentioned them until 1978), but 
they were an essential part of the political philosophy that inspired 
the constitution. The preliminary discourse with which the depu-
ties who wrote the first constitutional draft introduced their work 
often referred expressly to the case of the Basque Provinces and 
Navarre. From a cultural point of view the Basque tradition was 
a core part of the constituency that gave birth to Spanish constitu-
tional modernity. The Basque fora! political culture was, in other 
15 M. De Vattel (Emmerich De Vattel), Le, Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi 
Naturelle, Appliques a la conduite et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains (1758), 
facsimilar edition, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington DC, 1916. Pre-
liminaires § 1. 
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words, a valuable source of political philosophy for the first Span-
ish constitutionalism. 
In a comparative Atlantic context the Basque phase in the 
process of the dissolution of the Hispanic monarchy attests the 
possibilities of an autonomous transition from ancient to modem 
constitutionalism. If passing from Nueva Espana to Mexico was 
impossible under any form of Spanishness of the novohispana/ 
Mexican area, the legislation approved in 1839 for the Basque and 
Navaresse area induced a transition from old to new foralidad 
without breaking up with Spain. However much the urban Cre-
ole elite in Mexico pursued an integration in the «Spanish nation» 
resulting from the constitutional revolution performed in 1812, 
they were literally forced to «invent» a new political nation. As 
«Americanos», «Americanos del Norte», «Rijos de Anahuac», or 
«Mexicanos», they had to confront Spain and the Spanish nation 
in order to reinforce their own separate identity and their partic-
ular place under the sun of the «system of nations». As stated by 
the greatest military leader of the Spanish American independ-
ence, Simon Bolivar, the «Americanos» only could survive as free 
men if the «Spaniards» were expelled from America or killed. The 
«War to the Death» decreed by Bolivar was not only a military 
response to the Spanish reconquest of New Granada (Colombia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela), but also a reinforcement of American iden-
tity. 
Had not the «constitutional unity» been integrated in the Spa-
nish monarchy, something similar could have happened to the 
Basque territories and Navarre. The solution adopted in 1839 
opened the way to a reinterpretation of the Fueros as a provin-
cial identity that by the end of this period (1876) was broadly 
shared by Basques of different ideologies. The nacionalidad that 
the Basque conservative representative and provincial leader Pedro 
de Egafia exhibited before the Spanish senate in 1864 was by no 
means contradictory with his own espanolidad. On the contrary, 
Pedro de Egafia -as other fueristas- could not understand the 
first without the second. Emilio Castelar, the great democrat lead-
er, in his newspaper La Democracia praised the discourse delivered 
by Egafia and spoke highly of the Basque provinces as the «Span-
ish Switzerland». Joaquin Jamar, a leader of the Democratic Par-
ty in Guipuzcoa, at the beginning of the revolutionary crisis of 
1868 wrote a brochure in which he warmly proposed Basque foral-
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idad as a paradigm of self-government for the rest of Spain. «El 
Fuero es la constituci6n de Guipuzcoa» he proclaimed similarly to 
what the conservative member of the Union Liberal Fidel de Sa-
garmfnaga wrote this same revolutionary year referring to the 
Sefiorio de Vizcaya. 
Between conservatives and democrats, monarchists and repub-
licans, there was a common identity around the foralidad as re-
interpreted to survive in a modern constitutional context. In some 
way the foralidad played the role of a constitutional agreement, a 
basic shared political vascongada identity. As the case of Navarre 
illustrates, this fora! identity served also as a pathway to an au-
tonomous evolution towards the integration in the Spanish con-
stitutionalism. Though never accepted by Basque nationalists as 
a legitimate decision, in 1841 the Navaresse elite deliberately opt-
ed to follow a constitutional way totally differentiated from the 
Basque Provinces' own political itinerary. Taking for granted that 
every useful modern component of the «ancient constitution» of 
the kingdom had been transferred to the Spanish constitution of 
1837, they were more than happy to abandon what they them-
selves labeled as a «feudal» residue. The law granting Navarrese 
autonomy was first negotiated with the diputaci6n de Navarra and 
later approved by the Spanish Cortes in 1841, closing the evolu-
tion from ancient to modern foralidad symbolized in the change 
of the official name of the territory: from Reino to Provincia de 
Navarra. 
In the case of the Sefiorio de Vizcaya and provinces of Alava 
and Guipuzcoa such closing of the legal evolution never formally 
took place. The second article of the law passed in 1839 always 
remained as a desideratum of a definitive «Ley de Fueros». The 
lack of positive legislation was, however, replaced by a permanent 
negotiation between the Spanish governments and the Basque 
diputaciones (provincial governments) 16 • More a casuistic than a 
legislatively projected system, the foralidad reinforced the political 
role played by provincial institutions that assumed most of the 
16 See Javier Perez Nufiez, La diputaci6n {oral de Vizcaya. El regimen {oral en la 
construcci6n del Estado liberal (1808-1868), Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucio-
nales, 1996; Coro Rubio, Revoluci6n y Tradici6n. El Pa{s Vasco ante la Revoluci6n Li-
beral y la construcci6n del Est ado espaiiol, 1808-1868, Madrid, siglo XXI, 1996; Fernan-
do Martinez Rueda, Los poderes locales en Vizcaya. Del Antigua Regimen a la Revoluci6n 
Liberal 1700-1853, Bilbao, Universidad del Pais Vasco, 1994. 
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duties of a modem administration. By the fifties and sixties of the 
nineteenth century the «sistema foral» was generally recognized 
as a model for self-administration. As many observers pointed out, 
the peculiarities of the Basque system could be noted just contem-
plating the landscape. The baserriak (Basque country houses) 
spread all over the countryside denoted the anthropological cen-
trality of the «troncalidad» that assured the linkage between prop-
erty and household producing a numerous class of small land-
holders and long-term tenants. The cleanliness and «good 
disposition» of the buildings in small towns informed of an effec-
tive system of local administration. The road system -by far more 
developed than in the surrounding provinces- and the investment 
in educational and charitable organizations -whose buildings 
were also part of the fora! landscape- on the other hand, talked 
about the benefits of provincial self-government. 
Besides the exaggerated descriptions of Antonio de Trueba 
-who in the fifties and sixties of the nineteenth century present-
ed a Basque Arcadia of happy rural families enjoying working 
hard, praying, moderately drinking txakoli (wine), playing the txis-
tu (flute), and dancing zortziko- the Basque Provinces presented 
an interesting case for the emergent sociology17 • The Societe Inter-
nationale des Etudes Practiques d'Economie Sociale devoted a spe-
cial session in 1867 to consider the relationship between «social 
harmony» and the foral system in Biscay. His director, Frederic Le 
Play, was specifically interested in those legal frames that promot-
ed social stability finding good examples of them -on the track 
of the European enlightenment- in some Swiss cantons and in 
Biscay. 
Definitely the foralidad constituted a consolidated identity in 
the Basque Provinces by the end of its «golden age» in 1876. It 
was not a national identity since its more resolute supporters nev-
er had the slightest doubt about their belonging to the Spanish 
nation. It was, though, an identity equal to a nacionalidad or, as 
it was understood at that time, to a special way of being Span-
iards. In other words, the foralidad has nothing to do with the na-
17 The conservative and naive description of Trueba is reproduced in Mikel 
Urkijo Goitia, Dos aproximaciones a la sociedad vasca del ochocientos, Bilbao, Univer-
sidad del Pais Vasco, 2000. The everyday fight of the Basque peasantry for survival 
can be followed in Enriqueta Sesmero, Clases populares y carlismo en Bizkaia, 1850-
1872, Bilbao, Universidad de Deusto, 2000. 
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tionalist question of «ser o no ser» (Basque or Spanish), but with 
«la manera de estar» in the Spanish constitutional monarchy. This 
«manera de estar» consolidated in the new regimen fora! was not 
based at all on racial or linguistic assumptions, but on the idea 
of autonomy and self-government. History, language, and customs 
could reinforce the idiosyncratic character of the Basques, but the 
crucial point was the existence of peculiar provincial constitutions. 
If Joaquin Jamar and Fidel de Sagarminaga advocated for Basque 
Fueros in 1868 both as a constitutional reference for their own 
provinces and as a paradigm of sage administration for the rest 
of Spain, it was because both of them considered the Fueros a 
constitution. 
From an Atlantic perspective the Basque phase of the Hispan-
ic crisis constituted an important lesson. From it can be learnt, 
first, how relevant it was being European and not having castes 
or indigenous peoples in order to be admitted as an equal part of 
the nation. In 1867 General Francisco de Lersundi -born a Va-
lencian but of Basque ancestry- was simultaneously defending 
Basque Fueros in the Spanish senate and promoting slavery and 
fighting autonomist factions in Cuba as Capitan General. Liberal-
ism showed first its limits, then its possibilities. Secondly it can 
then demonstrate that centralism is not a must of the nation-State 
or a necessary consequence of what has been labeled as «Estado 
liberal». More importantly, the Basque experience of the Atlantic 
crisis of the Spanish monarchy can contribute to challenging the 
stereotyped image of the Spanish nation as founded on a Castil-
ian identity that literally swallowed other identities. That could be 
the case, or better the attempt, in the following phase of the con-
struction of the Spanish nation-State, but not from 1808 to 1876 
as the Basque phase witnesses. Finally the study of the Basque 
foralidad from a wider perspective might eventually lead Basque 
historians to a liberation from the nationalist paradigm, though 
honestly I am not optimistic about this. 
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